Raison et désir dans la philosophie de Spinoza

Abstract

A thorough analysis of Spinoza's philosophical thought shows clearly that the field of rationality is particularly complex and multiform. It is firstly a field of ideas : common notions, adequate ideas of divine attributes and of their infinite modes, ideas of essences of particular things. But it is also a field of images- that is, the rational images of common porperties of things, which "translate" the idea of necessity. It is finally a field of rational affects : "amor erga Deum, acquiescentia mentis, amor intellectualis Dei". The unity of this field derives from the "striving of desire" ("conatus seu cupiditas") by which the mind strives to persevere in its being by forming all kinds of ideas (adequate or indadequate) accompanied by the corresponding affects (active or passive). At this point, the relation between the notion of "conatus" and the notion of "cupiditas" is decisive. In the "Ethics", Spinoza conceives desire as identical to "conatus" : "At per conatum cupiditatem intelligimus". It follows that desire is more conceives desire as identical to "conatus" : "At per conatum cupiditatem intelligimus".It follows that desire is more fundamental than the two other primitive affects (joy and sadness). Moreover, desire can no longer be conceived as a mind's "part" or "faculty", since it constitutes the very essence of the mind : "cupiditas, quatenus ad mentem expressions of mental life, including the rational or intellectual ones"Tel qu'il peut être défini à partir d'une analyse de la pensée philosophique de Spinoza, le champ de la rationalité est singulièrement complexe et multiforme. Il est d'abord champ d'idées : notions communes, idées adéquates des attributs de Dieu, de leurs modes infinis et de tout ce qui en dérive, idées des essences des modes finis. Mais il est aussi champ d'images - entendons les images relationnelles