Abstract
The present PhD thesis concentrates on the original and largely provocative and controversial idea of human rights suggested by John Rawls in his later work “The Law of Peoples” (1999). Two decades after the publication of that monography, the present study explores the overall impact and influence of the rawlsian conception of human rights on philosophical reflection and dialogue, summarizing the bibliographical review of commentaries, criticisms and recastings of the rawlsian arguments. At the same time, a critical repositioning of these arguments into the corpus of rawlsian philosophy is being attempted. This research, however, is not apologetically targeted, nor does it seek to defend opinions that are not supported or, even more, are explicitly rejected by Rawls; instead, it hopes to detect implicit justifications that complement the admittedly sketchy presentation of the rawlsian human rights account. The special view and function of rawlsian human rights is part of the philosoph ...
The present PhD thesis concentrates on the original and largely provocative and controversial idea of human rights suggested by John Rawls in his later work “The Law of Peoples” (1999). Two decades after the publication of that monography, the present study explores the overall impact and influence of the rawlsian conception of human rights on philosophical reflection and dialogue, summarizing the bibliographical review of commentaries, criticisms and recastings of the rawlsian arguments. At the same time, a critical repositioning of these arguments into the corpus of rawlsian philosophy is being attempted. This research, however, is not apologetically targeted, nor does it seek to defend opinions that are not supported or, even more, are explicitly rejected by Rawls; instead, it hopes to detect implicit justifications that complement the admittedly sketchy presentation of the rawlsian human rights account. The special view and function of rawlsian human rights is part of the philosopher's general project to develop a “realistically utopian” theory of international justice. Around this idea the actors of ideal and non-ideal theory are constructed accordingly, and the reflective equilibrium between realism and idealism is pursued, following the russeauvian phrase “people as they are and laws as they might be”. Having already elaborated in detail the method of political constructivism in “Political Liberalism”, Rawls undertakes to establish reflectively his theory of international justice and, in this context, the special function and universal normativity of human rights. By reconstructing the sketchy description of the function of human rights, it is revealed that rawlsian human rights, while deprived of their individualistic claim-right character in the international field, nevertheless retain this character in the domestic field. Within societies, human rights express the constant claim for justice and legitimacy of political power according to the minima criteria adopted by the Law of Peoples. If this claim is not met, then (and only then) their external legitimizing function is to be activated: the international legitimacy of the regime that violates human rights is abolished and in a -more or less supplementary way- well-ordered peoples become fully authorized to take action in order to defend human rights. In order to clarify the justifying argument of the universal normativity of human rights, the research extends necessarily to the moral-philosophical content of the ideas of liberalism and decency and concentrates on substantive moral conceptions underlying them. The conclusions of this theoretical endeavor highlight, inter alia, the limits of Rawls's methodological choices (political constructivism and the idea of contract) on the one hand and the justifying function of the reflective equilibrium on the other. Through the analysis of the underlying normative ideas, it is suggested that human dignity is the implicit moral foundation of rawlsian human rights and, through them, of the universal normativity of the Law of Peoples. The incorporation of this value into modern international political culture allows Rawls to adopt it tacitly in his work without having to resort to comprehensive philosophical theories that would render his argument “politically parochial”. The omission of any theoretical reference to human dignity is counterbalanced at the practical-political level by the preeminent international political acknowledgement of human rights as its legal manifestations, vested especially with the threat of legitimate coercion in extreme cases of violations. These observations reveal the deontological philosophic core of the Law of Peoples. At the same time, the legitimizing function of human rights, while clearly falling short of the modern international standard, is counter-balanced by the properly constructed moral nature of the well-ordered peoples, which is a normative ideal of “The Law of Peoples”. Although the monography does not support the direct involvement of individuals in the international activation and defense of their rights, nevertheless the universally normative moral background of the ideas of liberalism and decency, as inscribed in the moral nature of peoples and preserved through it, guarantees that human rights will not be overlooked and will be a fundamental political concern and duty of every people seeking to be characterized as wellordered.
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